Injunctive and Reverse Settlements in Competition-Blocking Litigation (with Keith N. Hylton) by Cho, Sungjoon
Chicago-Kent College of Law
Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law
All Faculty Scholarship Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2013
Injunctive and Reverse Settlements in
Competition-Blocking Litigation (with Keith N.
Hylton)
Sungjoon Cho
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, scho1@kentlaw.iit.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/fac_schol
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has
been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For
more information, please contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sungjoon Cho, Injunctive and Reverse Settlements in Competition-Blocking Litigation (with Keith N. Hylton), 33 Eur. J. of L. & Econ. 243
(2013).
Available at: http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/fac_schol/175
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1490013
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Injunctive and Reverse Settlements in Competition-Blocking Litigation 
 
 
 
Keith N. Hylton 
 
Sungjoon Cho** 
 
 
August 2011 
 
 
 
Abstract: We distinguish standard settlements, in which the status quo is preserved, and 
injunctive settlements, which prohibit the defendant’s activity.  The reverse (payment) 
settlement is a special type of injunctive settlement.  We examine the divergence between 
private and social incentives to settle and policies that would minimize socially 
undesirable injunctive and reverse settlements (e.g., banning reverse settlements).  The 
results are applied to competition-blocking litigation, such as patent infringement and 
antidumping.  
 
 
JEL Classification: F13, K21, K33, K41, L43, O31 
 
Keywords: litigation; reverse payment settlements; injunctive settlements; patent 
infringement litigation; waiver agreements; antidumping
                                                 
 Professor of Law, Boston University, knhylton@bu.edu.  For helpful comments the authors thank Scott 
Baker, Daniel Crane, Ben Depoorter, Michael Meurer, and Steve Shavell.  An earlier version of this 
material appeared under the title “The Economics of Injunctive and Reverse Settlements”.  After that 
earlier working paper grew to roughly 50 pages, we separated the material examining reverse settlements 
generally (e.g., in the torts setting) from the material examining competition policy implications.  This 
paper focuses on competition policy implications. 
** Associate Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1490013
 1
I. Introduction 
 
This paper explores the economics and the competition policy implications of injunctive 
settlements – settlements that implement the terms of an injunction sought by the 
plaintiff.  The best known examples of such settlements are observed in the context of 
competition-blocking litigation, such as patent infringement and antidumping litigation. 
 
In the patent-antitrust context, a great deal of controversy surrounds “reverse settlements” 
(more precisely, reverse payment settlements) in patent infringement litigation.  The 
reverse settlement involves a plaintiff in a patent infringement suit (for example, a 
pharmaceutical company with a patent on a drug) paying the defendant (for example, a 
manufacturer of a generic drug) to settle the case.  The reverse settlement typically 
includes an agreement that the defendant will restrict sales of the allegedly infringing 
drug.  At present, federal circuit courts are split on the legality, under the antitrust laws, 
of reverse settlements in patent litigation.1 
 
In the antidumping context, a similar type of settlement is observed.  These are 
administrative proceedings in which the plaintiff is technically the United States 
Department of Commerce.  However, the Commerce Department’s proceeding is brought 
on behalf of or at the instigation of domestic firms that claim that a foreign seller has 
“dumped” goods at unreasonably low prices in their domestic market.  Some 
antidumping disputes are resolved when a complaint is withdrawn and the foreign seller 
increases its price in the domestic market (Prussa, 1992).  In other words, the foreign 
seller opts for some share of the domestic cartel’s profits rather than continuing to fight 
the dumping charge.  As we will see below, this type of settlement is indistinguishable in 
economic terms from the reverse settlement. 
 
This paper draws some practical insights on reverse settlements in competition-blocking 
litigation.  We start with a simple model of injunctive and reverse settlements2 and 
summarize its implications for the economics of settlements.  The model identifies 
general conditions under which injunctive settlements and reverse settlements are likely 
to be observed, and shows that in the competition-blocking scenario virtually all 
injunctive settlements will be in the form of reverse (payment) settlements.  In general, 
reverse settlements (in comparison to no settlement) are likely when the stakes associated 
with the injunction are large relative to damages and litigation costs. 
 
We then turn to normative questions, specifically the conditions under which injunctive 
and reverse settlements are likely to be harmful to social welfare in the context of 
competition-blocking litigation.  We also examine the divergence between private and 
                                                 
1 Favoring legality: In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 190 (2d Cir. 2006) (refusing to 
impose antitrust liability where generic accepted payment in exchange for agreement to delay entry); 
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th Cir. 2005) (same); In re Ciprofloxacin 
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., No. 08-1097 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 15, 2008) (same), available at 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/opinions/08-1097.pdf.  Opposing legality: In re Cardizem CD Antitrust 
Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding per se antitrust violation in agreement to delay generic 
entry); Andrx Pharm., Inc., v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (same). 
2 The model of settlement applied here is from Hylton and Cho, 2010. 
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social incentives to settle and policies that would minimize socially undesirable 
injunctive settlements.  If reverse settlements were barred, the potential litigants could 
switch to predispute waivers.  We examine the divergence between the private and the 
social incentives to waive in the competition-blocking context, as well as policies to 
minimize socially undesirable waivers.  One new policy examined is an optimal penalty 
that would align private and social incentives to settle or to enter into a predispute waiver 
agreement. 
 
We find that in the antidumping context there is a strong case for banning reverse 
settlements.  In patent-antitrust, the case for holding reverse settlements per se unlawful 
under the antitrust laws is unpersuasive.3  A reverse settlement may signal a weak claim 
on the part of the plaintiff, but it may also occur because the stakes associated with the 
injunction are high.  The stakes may be high because of the anticompetitive potential of 
the injunctive settlement, or because the injunction supports market development and 
innovation incentives.  The mere observation of a reverse settlement would not permit an 
observer to know whether the settlement is socially beneficial or detrimental.  The model 
below details the economic factors that should be considered in a legal analysis (e.g., rule 
of reason in antitrust) of reverse settlements in patent infringement litigation. 
 
II. Background 
 
Injunctive and reverse settlements can be observed in any area of litigation in which 
plaintiffs seek to enjoin some activity of the defendant.  One common example of this 
type of litigation is in the nuisance setting, where the plaintiff may sue for damages and 
to enjoin the defendant’s nuisance-generating activity.  A settlement could involve the 
defendant agreeing to discontinue his activity. 
 
Competition-blocking litigation provides the most prominent examples today of 
injunctive and reverse settlements.  Competition-blocking litigation typically involves a 
plaintiff (incumbent firm) with market power against a defendant (entrant) who intends to 
undercut the plaintiff in its market.  The plaintiff’s interest is to maintain the profit it 
earns from its monopoly.  The defendant’s interest is to maintain the profit it earns from 
undercutting the price set by the plaintiff. 
 
Let Gp represent the gain to the incumbent monopolist from blocking competition and Ld 
represent the loss to the entrant when competition is blocked.  The interests at stake in 
competition-blocking litigation can be described by Figure 1.  The rectangle denoted Gp 
shows the profit earned by the plaintiff (incumbent monopolist) when he charges the 
                                                 
3 This conclusion is in opposition to that taken by the FTC in federal court litigation and of several 
commentators, see Crane (2002); Cotter (2004); Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley (2003); and Hemphill 
(2006).  In addition, the European Commission has issued a report on patent practices, including 
settlements, that suggests the possibility of legal action against major pharmaceutical companies that have 
entered into reverse settlement agreements with generic sellers, see 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/746&format=HTML&aged=0&langu
age=EN&guiLanguage=en.  On February 3d, 2009, U.S. senators Herb Kohl and Chuck Grassley 
introduced legislation to ban reverse patent settlements in pharmaceutical patent disputes, see 
http://kohl.senate.gov/press/09/02/2009203B19.html.  
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monopoly price pm rather than the competitive price (given his cost structure) pc.  The 
social cost (or deadweight loss) from monopolization is shown by the triangular area W. 
 
The competitive price for the plaintiff pc is equal to its unit cost.  The rectangle denoted 
Ld represents the profit earned by the defendant entrant when he undercuts the unit cost of 
the plaintiff.  The minimum price for the defendant is pr, which is equal to its unit cost. 
 
In the antidumping context, a domestic cartel earns the profit shown by Gp when it 
excludes foreign competition.  If the cartel cannot block foreign competition, the foreign 
firms will enter and charge a price slightly below pc and take the market to themselves, 
capturing Ld.  Since Ld represents the profit available to the foreign sellers, it also 
represents the loss imposed on them by a competition-blocking injunction. 
 
In the patent-antitrust context, the drug patent holder charges pm when it blocks 
competition from the generic entrant.  If it cannot block the generic’s entry, the patent 
holder will reduce its price to pc.  Still, the generic seller may be able to earn a profit of as 
much as Ld by undercutting pc.4 
                                                 
4 This is an admittedly simple version of competition between an incumbent and a generic seller.  In many 
instances the generic entrant sells to price-sensitive consumers while the incumbent sells to brand-loyal 
consumers.  As a result, the entry of a generic is sometimes followed with a price increase by the 
incumbent seller, see Blair & Cotter (2002).    
 4
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Diagram of Plaintiff’s Gain (Gp), Defendant’s Loss (Ld),  
and Deadweight Loss (W) 
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III. Model 
 
A. Economics of Litigation with Injunctive Settlements 
 
In this part we examine the incentives driving parties to litigate and to settle when the 
lawsuit seeks both damages and an injunction (injunctive litigation).  The standard 
economic analysis of litigation examines the lawsuit for damages (standard litigation).  
Since the economic analysis of settlement is familiar, we will focus on the model’s 
application to competition-blocking lawsuits. 
 
The litigation process is one in which the plaintiff files a complaint, which is then either 
settled or prosecuted to a final judgment.  The final judgment enjoins the defendant’s 
activity.  In a competition-blocking lawsuit, the final judgment would require the 
defendant to increase its price and cede market share, thus losing its gain from low-price 
entry, and perhaps to transfer money as compensation to the plaintiff. 
 
In the patent infringement setting, the plaintiff prosecutes his own claim against the low-
price defendant.  That claim can lead to an injunction against the generic seller as well as 
damages for the losses suffered by the plaintiff from infringement.  In the antidumping 
context, a government agency (the U.S. Department of Commerce) prosecutes the claim. 
But the plaintiff (the industry whose interests are represented by the Department of 
Commerce) can lay claim to the antidumping penalty under the “Byrd Amendment” 
(repealed in 2005).5  The final judgment typically requires the defendant to increase its 
price, thus losing its gain from low-price entry, and to pay an antidumping penalty. 
 
Let Pp = the plaintiff’s perception of the probability of winning, Jp = the payoff to the 
plaintiff and Cp = the cost to the plaintiff.  In the patent infringement setting, the 
plaintiff’s perception of the probability of winning is determined by his prediction that 
the court will find that infringement occurred, which is a function of the patent’s validity 
and the defendant’s conduct.  In the antidumping context, the plaintiff’s perception of the 
likelihood of victory is high in comparison to civil litigation because disputes are tried 
within an agency that is charged with representing plaintiffs’ interests (Cho, 2009). 
 
Complaints are filed when the net reward, PpJp – Cp, is positive (Shavell, 1982a).  Since 
the plaintiff’s judgment consists of Gp = the gain the plaintiff gets from the injunction, 
and D = the damage award, he will file a claim when Pp(Gp+D) – Cp > 0. 
 
Let Pd = the defendant’s prediction of the plaintiff’s probability of winning (likelihood of 
finding a violation), Cd = the litigation cost borne by the defendant, and Jd = the 
defendant’s assessment of the cost of the judgment.  Since the judgment consists of the 
loss to the defendant from the injunction and the damage award, Jd = Ld + D, the 
defendant’s cost of the lawsuit is Pd(Ld +D) + Cd .  In the context of competition-
                                                 
5 On the Byrd Amendment, see “Byrd’s Bad Idea is Back, Wall Street Journal, Opinion Section, Monday, 
August 11, 2008, at A14.  Although repealed in 2005, there have been efforts to reenact the Byrd 
Amendment. 
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blocking litigation, the cost of the judgment to the defendant consists of the loss that 
results from being forced to raise price and cede market share plus the amount the 
defendant will have to pay as compensation to the plaintiff. 
 
If the expected net gain to the plaintiff from the lawsuit is less than the defendant’s total 
cost of litigation, the parties will settle.  Settlement therefore occurs when PpGp – PdLd + 
(Pp – Pd)D < Cp + Cd , which is the familiar settlement condition of the Landes-Posner-
Gould model.6  Since the settlement payment must exceed the expected net reward to the 
plaintiff from suing and since the expected net reward must be positive for the plaintiff to 
have a credible claim of suing, the settlement will involve a (positive) payment from the 
defendant to the plaintiff. 
 
However, the economics of settlement in injunctive litigation are not fully described by 
the Landes-Posner-Gould model, because that model ignores settlements that implement 
the injunction sought by the plaintiff (Hylton and Cho, 2010).  For example, in the 
competition-blocking context, a settlement implementing the terms of the injunction 
sought by the plaintiff involves the defendant raising its price or exiting the market in 
order to let the plaintiff firm or cartel sell at the monopoly price. 
  
In the injunctive settlement the defendant accepts the terms of the injunction sought by 
the plaintiff.  Such a settlement is desirable to the defendant if the total cost of the 
settlement to the defendant is less than the total cost of the lawsuit, or, equivalently, S + 
Ld < Pd(Ld+D) + Cd, where S is the settlement amount.  The settlement is desirable to the 
plaintiff if the sum of the transfer and the gain from the injunction exceed his net payoff 
from the lawsuit: S + Gp > Pp(Gp+D) – Cp.  It follows that the injunctive settlement will 
be observed if (1–Pd)Ld – (1–Pp)Gp + (Pp–Pd)D < Cp + Cd.  Unlike the standard 
settlement, the injunctive settlement may require a payment from plaintiff to defendant, 
which is the reverse payment settlement. 
 
Since the reverse settlement is controversial, it is worthwhile to examine the conditions 
under which it will be observed.  The foregoing implies that the reverse settlement will be 
observed when Ld > Pd(D + Ld) + Cd and Gp > Pp(D + Gp) – Cp.  Suppose the defendant’s 
loss from an injunction is large relative to the damages and litigation cost.  Since an 
injunctive settlement would require the defendant to bear the loss from the injunction 
with certainty, while litigation involves only a risk of the loss, the defendant will demand 
to be paid in order to accept the injunctive settlement.  Also, as the defendant becomes 
more optimistic, he will demand a payment in order to settle.  Thus, reverse settlements 
are more likely when the plaintiff’s likelihood of victory is low or when the stakes (Ld , 
Gp) are high. 
 
The case of consistent beliefs (Pd = Pp = P) is important because it reflects the 
circumstances in some competition-blocking proceedings (e.g., antidumping).  If 
                                                 
6 This follows from Pp(Gp+D) – Cp < Pd(Ld +D) + Cd.  This assumes that the probability of an injunction is 
the same as the probability of an award of damages.  That may not be valid in all cases.  To keep the model 
simple, we will stick with this assumption.  The results are easily changed for the case in which the 
probabilities differ. 
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transaction costs are low some type of settlement (standard or injunctive) will always 
occur under consistent beliefs (Hylton and Cho, 2010). 
 
B. Competition-Blocking Litigation 
 
In this part we establish a general result for settlements in competition-blocking 
litigation.  Recall that the competition-blocking scenario involves a plaintiff/incumbent 
and a defendant/entrant.  Knowing that the incumbent will file a competition-blocking 
complaint, the entrant will enter when and only when the gain from entry is greater than 
the expected cost of litigation Ld > Pd(D + Ld) + Cd.  However, recall that an injunctive 
settlement will be desirable to the defendant only when S + Ld < Pd(Ld+D) + Cd.  It 
follows that in the competition-blocking scenario: 
 
Proposition 1: All injunctive settlements of competition-blocking litigation will be in the 
form of reverse payment settlements. 
 
The intuition behind this statement is straightforward.  Since entry occurs only when the 
gain to the entrant exceeds the expected cost of litigation, the entrant will demand a 
payment in order to accept the terms of the injunctive settlement.  In the remainder, we 
will apply this result to specific areas of competition-blocking litigation. 
 
III. Applications of Model to Competition-Blocking Litigation 
 
The preceding part focused on the incentives for injunctive settlements and contrasted 
those incentives with the analysis of standard settlements.  Allowing for injunctive 
settlements expands the range of settlement agreements available to the parties, and 
explains the observation of reverse settlements. 
 
Our focus here is on specific types of competition-blocking litigation, specifically 
antidumping proceedings and patent infringement litigation.  While we have emphasized 
positive analysis to this point, most of the issues examined below are normative.  We will 
identify the factors that determine the welfare effects of injunctive settlements of 
competition-blocking litigation. 
 
A. Antidumping 
 
Before examining the implications of the foregoing for antidumping litigation, we should 
set out some details on the antidumping process.  Antidumping investigations and 
proceedings are conducted by two federal agencies, the International Trade 
Administration (part of the United States Department of Commerce) and the International 
Trade Commission (Cho, 2009).  An investigation is carried out in response to a 
complaint filed by a group of domestic firms,7 and seeks to determine whether the 
domestic firms have suffered a material injury (Cho, 2009).  If the ITC’s preliminary 
injury determination is positive, the ITA issues its own preliminary determination on the 
                                                 
7 The current antidumping statute permits domestic producers to petition relevant government agencies to 
investigate alleged dumping practices by foreign producers.  19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1). 
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existence of dumping, which is defined as a domestic sale at less than fair value.8  The 
two agencies subsequently issue final determinations on dumping and injury, 
respectively. 
 
Because the investigation and “prosecution” are carried out by government agencies, the 
litigation costs borne by the domestic complainants are relatively small.  Conversely, the 
litigation costs borne by foreign defendants are relatively large.  Defendants are forced to 
litigate against a government agency that works on behalf of domestic complainants, and 
under procedural rules that are biased in favor of domestic complainants and burdensome 
on foreign defendants (Cho, 2009).  If there is a finding of remediable dumping, the ITA 
calculates a damage award that is equal to the difference between the agency’s estimated 
“home price” for the imported item (fair value) and the actual price of the item in the 
import market.  This difference is known as the dumping margin. 
 
Although the agency’s only remedy is to impose antidumping duties to the extent of the 
dumping margin, the final judgment often has the effect of requiring the defendant to 
increase its price and cede market share, thus losing its gain from low-price entry.  In 
addition, under the Byrd Amendment (repealed in 2005), the antidumping penalty is 
transferred to the complainants.  
 
In terms of the model in this paper, antidumping proceedings can be described as a 
setting in which Cp is small,9 Cd is large,10 and P is high.  Moreover, P will be the same 
for both plaintiff and defendant, since both know that the process is biased in favor of 
plaintiffs.  We will treat antidumping proceedings as consistent-belief disputes. 
  
Although the proceeding is undertaken by the government, the plaintiff domestic cartel 
has the option of withdrawing its complaint against the foreign seller (or threatening to 
file the complaint and then never filing it).  Withdrawing a complaint is equivalent to 
settling the dispute.11  We will therefore treat the antidumping process as a form of 
private litigation between the plaintiff domestic cartel and the foreign seller. 
 
Given that the probability of plaintiff victory is high, injunctive settlements are likely in 
antidumping litigation.  In addition, injunctive settlements are likely if the plaintiff 
cartel’s gain is greater than the foreign seller’s loss from the injunction (Ld < Gp), a 
condition that is likely to hold.  Finally, in the antidumping context transaction costs will 
                                                 
8 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b).  
9 Petitioners can expect the government to absorb most of the litigation costs under the statutory 
proceeding, see Calvani & Tritell (1986). 
10 An antidumping proceeding imposes enormous costs on the defendants, see Music Centers S.N.C. Di 
Luciano Pisoni & C. v. Prestini Musical Instruments Corp, 874 F.Supp. 543, 547 (1995). Therefore, an 
antidumping petition itself can be a very effective method of non-price predation against small yet efficient 
foreign producers. The existence of such non-price predation tends to facilitate an injunctive settlement 
between antidumping petitioners and respondents. Cho (2009) 
11 Taylor (2001) observes that some antidumping cases withdrawn during the period 1990 to 1997 revealed 
the same pattern of changes in price and quantity as observed in collusive agreements.   
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rule out the standard settlement that preserves the status quo.12  The plaintiff cartel will be 
unlikely to accept and unable to enforce an agreement in which they receive a side 
payment from the foreign entrant in order to relinquish the market to the foreign firm.  
Given this, we explore only the injunctive settlement here. 
 
In the antidumping context, injunctive settlements are not only likely, but they will 
virtually always be observed in the form of reverse payment settlements.  To see this, 
consider the following application of the model to the antidumping scenario. 
 
Given the threat of an antidumping prosecution, the foreign entrant will enter the market 
when Ld – P(D + Ld) – Cd  > 0, or when P < Pe  (Ld – Cd)/(Ld +D).  The plaintiff 
(incumbent domestic cartel) will file a claim when P(Gp +D) – Cp > 0, or when P > Pf  
Cp/(Gp+D).13  Thus, entry occurs and an antidumping claim will be filed for Pf < P < Pe.  
From this it follows that: 
 
Proposition 2: All settlements of antidumping prosecutions will be in the form of reverse 
payment (injunctive) settlements. 
 
This proposition follows from two points established already.  First, recall that standard 
settlements will not be observed because of transaction costs.  Second, note that since 
entry occurs only when P < Pe, Ld – P(D + Ld) + Cd  > 0, for all such P, and the rest 
follows from Proposition 1. 
 
In addition to the finding that the only type of settlement that will be observed is the 
reverse payment settlement, this model also implies such settlements will be common. 
 
Proposition 3: If the plaintiff/incumbent’s gain is greater than the entrant’s loss from the 
injunction (Ld < Gp), then all antidumping prosecutions will settle with a reverse 
payment.  If the plaintiff/incumbent’s gain is less than the entrant’s loss from the 
injunction (Ld > Gp), then settlements will be observed when and only when 
 
       1 d pe
d p
C C
P P
L G
    . 
 
The proof of this claim follows straightforwardly from the general settlement conditions 
described in the first part of this paper.  First, let S = – S, since we are dealing with only 
reverse payment settlements.  A settlement will occur when (1–P)Ld – Cd < S < (1–P)Gp 
+ Cp.  Equivalently, settlement occurs when (1–P)(Ld – Gp) < Cp + Cd, from which the 
result follows.  This argument assumes Pf < P < Pe. 
 
                                                 
12 It might seem at first glance that the standard settlement should be ruled out by the assumption of 
consistent beliefs (Pd = Pp = P).  But even in the consistent-beliefs case a standard settlement may occur 
when Ld > Gp. 
13 The entry constraint exploited in this model is emphasized in Higgins (2002).  
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Example 1: Consider an example that captures some of the features of antidumping 
litigation.  Suppose the gain to the plaintiff cartel (alternatively, the potential domestic 
cartel profit) is $500 and the loss to the defendant foreign seller is $200. The cost of 
litigation is $1 for the plaintiff domestic cartel (because the government, in effect 
representing the domestic cartel, bears most of the expenses) and $20 for the defendant.  
The probability of plaintiff victory is 90%.  The damage award, which is equal to the 
dumping margin, is $10.  This is not necessarily a compensatory measure; it may exceed 
actual losses by the plaintiff.  In order to accept an injunctive settlement, the defendant 
has to consider whether the cost of such a settlement, S + $200, is less than the cost of 
litigation, (.9)($10) + (.9)($200) + $20; which is true for any settlement S < $9.  In order 
to prefer the injunctive settlement the plaintiff considers whether the settlement payoff S 
+ $500 is greater than the litigation payoff (.9)($500) – $1 + (.9)($10); which is true for S 
> –$42.  Given Proposition 2, a reverse payment injunctive settlement will occur with a 
payment from the plaintiff to the defendant that satisfies $0 < S < $42. 
 
The reverse payment settlement in this example requires the plaintiff domestic cartel to 
drop its complaint against the foreign seller and the foreign seller to cede market share to 
the plaintiff cartel.  The settlement might involve the plaintiff domestic cartel either 
sharing part of its profits or paying a sum, as long as the amount is no greater than $42, to 
the defendant foreign seller.  Or the arrangement may be one in which foreign seller both 
receives a reverse payment and is permitted to continue selling in the domestic market at 
a higher price.  Suppose the reverse payment is $25.  This is 5 percent of the potential 
cartel profit of $500.  One way to carry out such a settlement would be to assign 5 
percent of the domestic market to the foreign seller.14 
 
B. Antidumping Continued: Welfare Implications 
 
In antidumping disputes, the gain to the domestic cartel from ousting the foreign seller 
comes out of the potential consumer surplus available to domestic consumers.  The 
cartel’s payoff is not attributable to efficiency gains that result from the exclusion of the 
foreign seller.  The end result of the injunction, or the injunctive settlement, is 
unambiguously inefficient. 
 
The foregoing analysis shows that reverse injunctive settlements are more likely as the 
probability of plaintiff victory increases and as the plaintiff’s gain from the injunction 
increases relative to the defendant’s loss.  When the reverse settlement results primarily 
because the plaintiff’s probability of victory is very high (i.e., close to one, subject to the 
constraint that entry is profitable) it reflects the parties’ desire to avoid litigation costs.  
Injunctive settlement in this case reflects the outcome likely to result from litigation, and 
therefore is unlikely to harm social welfare. 
 
When the reverse injunctive settlement occurs primarily because the plaintiff’s gain is 
greater than the defendant’s loss (Ld < Gp), then there is reason to worry that injunctive 
settlements are especially harmful to social welfare.  The reason is, as Figure 1 shows, the 
gain to the plaintiff will be positively correlated with the social welfare loss.  Indeed, 
                                                 
14 On collusion and injunctive settlements of antidumping disputes, see Prussa (1992). 
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consider the case of an injunctive settlement where the plaintiff’s gain is both substantial 
and only slightly greater than the defendant’s loss.  The loss in social welfare is at its 
greatest, because the injunction excludes from the market a foreign seller with a big cost 
advantage over the domestic firms.15 
 
We have confined ourselves to antidumping cases as a special type of competition-
blocking litigation, where the injunction has an inefficient result.  The question we have 
considered so far is if the injunctive settlement is a signal, in this set of instances, of 
particularly worrisome cases.  The answer is yes. 
 
Should the injunctive settlement be banned?  The injunctive settlement should be banned 
if  
 
(1)  (1–P)(W + Ld) > Cp + Cd . 
 
If this holds, the payoff to society from cases in which courts deny injunctions (i.e., the 
social gain from competitive entry) exceeds the costs generated by litigating those cases.  
Given this, injunctive settlements reduce social welfare.  Since all of the injunctive 
settlements will be reverse payment settlements, we will consider whether reverse 
injunctive settlements should be banned. 
  
Proposition 4: A reverse antidumping settlement should be prohibited if the expected 
gain to consumers from entry exceeds the plaintiff’s cost of litigation ((1–P)W > Cp). 
 
The argument for this runs as follows.  From (1), we know that the reverse settlement is 
welfare reducing if (1–P)W + (1–P)Ld > Cp + Cd.  If (1–P)Ld > PD + Cd, then a reverse 
settlement is feasible (see Part II), and it will be welfare reducing whenever (1–P)W > Cp.  
The final step of the argument is to show that a reverse settlement is unlikely to be 
observed when (1–P)Ld < PD + Cd (i.e., defendant does not need to receive money to 
settle).  This is implied by the Landes-Posner-Gould model and the fact that the plaintiff 
moves first by filing.  Given that he moves first, the plaintiff will always make a positive 
demand that is within the settlement zone if (1–P)Ld < PD + Cd, and the parties will 
settle.  Otherwise (i.e., reversing the inequality), the plaintiff will offer the smallest 
reverse payment necessary to settle. 
 
The condition (1–P)W > Cp is likely to hold because Cp will be relatively small.  The 
reason is that the plaintiff spends relatively little because a government agency prosecutes 
the complaint; the agency’s costs are largely fixed and the burden of producing evidence 
is largely on the defendant/foreign entrant.  It follows, then, that social welfare could be 
improved by banning the reverse injunctive settlement in the antidumping context. 
 
Since antidumping injunctions lead to inefficient results, the suggestion that the reverse 
injunctive settlement be banned should not be seen as a surprise.  Still, in the presence of 
substantial litigation costs, it is not clear that every reverse injunctive settlement will be 
                                                 
15 Prussa (1992) provides empirical evidence that settled antidumping disputes are associated with 
reductions in trade that are at least as large as those resulting from adjudicated disputes. 
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socially undesirable.  Proposition Two shows that the case for banning reverse injunctive 
settlements remains strong in the antidumping context, even with substantial litigation 
costs taken into account. 
 
There are other settings that share the general structure of the antidumping problem.  A 
hush money settlement saves society litigation expenses, but may also impose welfare 
costs (Daughety & Reinganum, 1999).  Or consider the procurement setting, with two 
contractors.  The incumbent contractor can seek to have the efficient entrant contractor 
deemed ineligible, a costly process like litigation (Marshall, Meurer, & Richard, 1994).  
The incumbent may prefer to pay off the efficient entrant, which is the same as a reverse 
settlement. 
 
C. Patent Antitrust and More General Applications 
 
Unlike antidumping prosecutions, patent infringement cases cannot be treated as 
consistent-belief disputes with a high probability of plaintiff victory.  Many of the 
disputes involve low-probability claims on the part of the plaintiff patent holder and 
disparate beliefs as to the plaintiff’s likelihood of success.  On the other hand, in many of 
the patent infringement cases the plaintiff’s gain from the injunction exceeds the 
defendant’s loss.  Given this, and the foregoing analysis, the reverse settlement should be 
taken as a sign of potentially harmful welfare consequences in the patent-antitrust 
context.16 
 
However, the patent infringement setting is more complicated than the antidumping 
setting.  The patent infringement cases involve dynamic innovation incentives and static 
demand-inducement incentives that are likely to be affected by the willingness of courts 
to grant competition-blocking injunctions. 
 
Consider the static demand-inducement factor.  Suppose the plaintiff firm – e.g., a drug 
company – invests in creating demand for its new product – a drug.  If the injunction is 
awarded in its favor, it will have an incentive to continue to invest in promotion.  Thus, 
unlike the antidumping scenario, excluding the low-cost rival causes supports product 
promotion, which causes the demand curve to shift outward, as in Figure 2. 
                                                 
16 There is a large literature identifying the potential welfare costs of reverse settlements in the patent 
context.  See, e.g., Shapiro (2003); Hovenkamp, Janis, & Lemley (2003); Cotter (2004). 
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       Figure 2: Diagram of Static Efficiency Gain due to Demand Inducement 
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Because the injunction itself could be socially desirable, the injunctive settlement could 
be socially desirable.  However, we do not know in advance whether a particular 
injunction is socially desirable – that is, we do not know in advance whether the dispute 
is best characterized by Figure 1 or by Figure 2. 
 
1. Modifying the Basic Model 
 
The settlement model can be modified to take into account the special considerations in 
patent infringement litigation.  The new features to take into account are the static and 
dynamic efficiency effects.  As in Figure 2, let ΔGp represent the captured portion of the 
static efficiency gain.   
 
The dynamic incentive is difficult to model from the ground up, but we will simplify 
matters by assuming that there is a potential dynamic incentive cost resulting from the 
rejection of the plaintiff’s infringement claim.  Let the social cost of the dynamic 
incentive effect be .  The social cost is likely to be a function of the ex ante probability 
of infringement.17  For example, if the ex ante probability of infringement is close to zero 
because the patent is invalid, then the social cost of a rejection of the plaintiff’s 
infringement claim is probably close to zero.  As a general rule, then, the social cost of 
the dynamic incentive effect is an increasing function of the ex ante probability of 
infringement.18  The portion of the social cost borne by the plaintiff will be represented 
by γ. 
 
Using Proposition 1, any injunctive settlement will be a reverse payment settlement.  The 
reverse payment (injunctive) settlement is desirable to the infringement plaintiff if  
 
(2) S + Gp + ΔGp > Pp(Gp + ΔGp + D) – Cp – (1–Pp) γ   
 
where S < 0, and the last term reflects the plaintiff’s perception of the dynamic incentive 
cost of losing his patent monopoly.  The condition determining whether the settlement is 
desirable to the defendant is the same as in the basic model examined in the part III. 
 
An injunctive settlement will be desirable, as between the litigating firms, when 
 
(3) (1–Pd)Ld – (1–Pp)(Gp + ΔGp)+ (Pp–Pd)D – (1–Pp) γ < Cp + Cd 
                                                 
17 The term ex ante probability of infringement was introduced in Crane (2002).  Crane suggests that the 
social cost of rejecting an infringement claim is positively correlated with the ex ant probability of 
infringement (Crane, 2002, at 780). 
18 More precisely, the social cost will be a function of the probability that the patent is valid and that it was 
infringed, and it should be an increasing function in both variables.  However, the marginal contribution of 
each variable to the social cost will not be the same.  The social cost is also a function of the wealth 
generated by the patent incentive.  The wealth generated by a patent is the sum of the consumer surplus and 
monopoly profits generated by the patent.  Specifically, the term γ will be determined in part by the 
expected stream of patent profits forgone because of the discouragement effect.  The remainder term (1- 
γ)  will equal be determined in part by the expected residual consumer welfare forgone because of the 
discouragement effect.  These terms are capable of estimation. 
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To simplify, consider the consistent beliefs case, where the injunctive settlement 
condition becomes 
 
(4) (1–P)(Ld – Gp – ΔGp – γ ) < Cp + Cd  , 
 
or 
 
(5) Ld < Gp + ΔGp + (Cp + Cd)/(1–P) + γ . 
 
Incorporating efficiencies does not greatly change the analysis from the basic model 
examined earlier in this paper.  Note that if Gp>Ld then a reverse settlement will occur in 
any setting in which entry is desirable to defendant and the plaintiff has an incentive to 
file an infringement action (Proposition 3).  The scope for injunctive settlements expands 
because the gain to the plaintiff is now greater than in the previous analysis (because of 
the static efficiency effect), and because the cost of failing to settle is greater too (because 
of the dynamic efficiency effect). 
 
P represents the objective probability that the plaintiff will prevail, or the ex ante 
probability of infringement.  We can also treat P as an index of the patent’s validity.19  
Using Figure 2, injunctive settlements should be banned if  
 
(6)    (1–P)[W + Ld – (ΔGp + Z)]  > Cp + Cd  + (1–P)  
 
The first two terms on the left hand side of (6) equal the expected welfare gain from 
competitive entry.  The next two terms, (ΔGp + Z), equal the static efficiency gain from 
the injunction.  The last term on the right hand side is the expected dynamic efficiency 
loss.  It should be clear that (1–P)[W + Ld – (ΔGp + Z) – ] is the social return from 
litigation.20  The injunctive settlement should be banned if the social return from 
litigation exceeds the cost of litigation. 
 
Thus, in patent infringement litigation, banning the injunctive settlement is socially 
desirable only if the expected welfare gain from competitive entry exceeds the static 
efficiency gains from the injunction, the cost of litigation, and the dynamic incentive cost. 
 
As suggested in Shapiro (2003), the strength of the underlying patent infringement claim 
P plays an important role in determining the social desirability of an injunctive 
settlement.  However, the scope of the patent and the market, the size of the efficiency 
                                                 
19 P is the product of the probability of validity and the probability of infringement (assuming the two are 
independent).  Treating it as an index of patent validity is clearly imprecise because it implicitly assumes 
that the probability of infringement is one. 
20 If there is a strong correlation between  and P, the social return from litigation should be expressed as 
(1–P)[W + Ld – (ΔGp + Z) – (P)], which reflects the assumption of Crane (2002).  If  increases strongly 
in P, then the social return to litigation would not only approach zero as P increases, but is also more likely 
to be negative for high P values.  Focusing on P might serve as a short cut to trying to determining the 
social return from patent litigation.  In general, the relationship between  and P is an empirical question. 
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gain from entry, static and dynamic efficiency costs,21 and litigation costs also play a 
role.  These factors suggest that a rule of reason analysis of competition blocking 
settlements in the patent setting could be quite complicated. 
 
2. Incentive Alignment and Optimal Penalty 
 
Given the ambiguous welfare effects of the injunctive settlement in the patent context, 
one solution to the settlement problem is to alter the incentives of the plaintiff so that he 
seeks an injunctive settlement only under conditions in which it is socially desirable. 
 
a. Incentive Alignment under Consistent Beliefs 
 
Consider an example in which the parties have consistent beliefs.  The private settlement 
condition (3) can be used with the social incentive condition (6) to determine a penalty 
(or subsidy) that would align the incentives of the individual firms with the social 
incentive on settlement.  If the plaintiff is required to pay, 
 
(7) Gp + W – Z – (1– γ) 
 
upon gaining his injunction, then the social incentive to settle will be the same as the 
private incentive to settle,22 which means that the parties will seek a settlement only when 
it is socially desirable.  The optimal penalty requires the plaintiff to regurgitate the 
monopoly rent and to pay for the deadweight loss; however, it also subsidizes the 
plaintiff an amount equal to the “uncaptured” static and dynamic efficiency gains.  The 
optimal penalty should be applied to the monopolist whether it gains its injunction 
through a court order or through settlement. 
 
The optimal penalty in (7) is a generalized version of the monopolization penalty of 
Landes (1983).  If the static and dynamic efficiency effects are zero, as in the 
antidumping scenario, the optimal penalty is equal to the monopoly transfer plus the 
deadweight loss (Gp+W ).  Similarly, if the static efficiency gain is captured completely 
by the monopolist and the dynamic cost is borne in its entirety by the monopolist, the 
optimal penalty is again equal to the monopoly transfer plus the deadweight loss. 
 
b. Incentive Alignment and Inconsistent Beliefs  
 
We have so far considered incentive alignment in the case of consistent beliefs.  The 
optimal penalty would require the monopolist to pay for the welfare transfer from 
consumers as well as the deadweight loss, and subsidize the monopolist to the extent of 
uncaptured static and dynamic efficiency gains.  We explore in this section whether this 
                                                 
21 The dynamic incentive effect is emphasized in Langenfeld & Li (2004) and in Blair & Cotter (2002). 
22 If the penalty is set equal to (7) the plaintiff’s net reward will be Gp – (Gp + W – Z – (1– γ) ) = –W + Z + 
(1– γ).  This implies that the private settlement condition will be equivalent to the social settlement 
condition.  Specifically, the private joint payoff from litigation is (1–P)(Ld – Gp – ΔGp – γ ).  The social 
payoff from litigation is (1–P)[W + Ld – (ΔGp + Z) – ].  When the penalty is set according to (7), these 
payoffs are the same. 
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approach remains valid in cases in which the litigants have inconsistent beliefs regarding 
the ex ante probability of infringement. 
 
First, consider the setting in which litigating parties’ beliefs are consistent with the Priest-
Klein (1984) hypothesis.  Trial-outcome predictions diverge but only because of random 
differences in beliefs.  Under the Priest-Klein model, trial-outcome beliefs are generated 
according Pd = P + d, Pp = P + p, where d and p have mean zero, and where P is the 
objective estimate of the likelihood of a verdict for the plaintiff (the probability of a 
finding of patent infringement) (Hylton, 2006).  If the optimal penalty is imposed on the 
patent holder then settlement will be acceptable to the parties when 
 
(8) (1–P)(W – (ΔGp + Z) + Ld –  ) – p(W – (ΔGp + Z) –  )  
                                                                                – dLd + (p–d)D < Cp + Cd 
 
and since p and d have mean zero, the private and social incentives to settle will be the 
same in expectation.  Thus, in the Priest-Klein scenario, the optimal incentive alignment 
penalty accomplishes its objective.23 
 
Now consider the inconsistent beliefs scenario where Pd = P, Pp = P + Q, and 1–P > Q > 
0.  The defendant’s prediction is equal to the objective probability of infringement, while 
the plaintiff overestimates the likelihood the patent will be upheld.  The joint private 
return from litigation is equal in expectation to 
 
(9) (1–P)(Ld – Gp – ΔGp – γ ) + Q(Gp + ΔGp + γ ) + QD 
 
where the first term reflects the potential net gain if the injunction is overturned.  The last 
two terms reflect the differences in the parties’ expectations of the trial outcome.  Recall 
that the social return from litigation is equal to (1–P)(W + Ld – (ΔGp + Z ) – ) . 
 
The optimal penalty equates the private and social returns from litigation.  Unlike the 
Priest-Klein scenario, the optimal penalty is no longer the generalized monopolization 
penalty (Landes, 1983) in (7).  In this case, the optimal penalty is 
 
(10) Gp + (W – Z – (1– γ) ) + (1–)[Q(ΔGp + γ +D)] 
 
where   = (1–P)/(1–P–Q) > 1.  The intuitive explanation for (10) is easier seen under the 
assumption that there are no static or dynamic efficiency concerns, in which case the 
optimal penalty would be 
 
                                                 
23 The Priest-Klein generates a plaintiff win rate prediction of 50 percent.  This is consistent with the 
evidence on patent litigation.  Plaintiff win rates in patent infringement litigation are roughly 50 percent, 
see Allison & Lemley (1998).  Thus, the empirical evidence suggests that patent infringement trials can be 
described by the Priest-Klein model.  However, this does not imply that half of patents are invalid.  The 
evidence on win rates shows that only the most uncertain patents are litigated all the way to judgment, and 
that within the sample of litigated patents plaintiffs are no better than defendants at determining the validity 
of the patent. 
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(11)         Gp + W + (1–)QD . 
 
Since the litigation decision is influenced by the divergent trial-outcome expectations of 
the parties, the optimal penalty reduces the relative importance of this effect by 
increasing the weight on W.  In addition, since divergent expectations already push the 
parties into litigation, there is a lesser need in this case to use a large penalty (because 
some monopolies will be overturned by the court).  This is the reason for the last term in 
(11), which is negative. 
 
The lesson suggested here is that when divergent beliefs (or asymmetric information) 
drive the parties into litigation (because plaintiffs believe that the likelihood of a finding 
of infringement is greater than defendants think it is), the optimal penalty is less than it 
would be under consistent beliefs (7) because the worst-case monopolization scenario 
will be overturned more often in the courts.  Conversely, when divergent beliefs cause the 
parties to litigate less frequently than they would under consistent beliefs (because 
defendants believe the likelihood of a finding of infringement is less than plaintiffs think 
it is), the optimal penalty will be greater than it would be under consistent beliefs. 
 
3. Waivers 
 
A policy of banning reverse or injunctive settlements would lead parties to opt for pre-
dispute settlements, or waivers.  Since the private and social returns from litigation are 
not the same, predispute waivers will be exchanged under conditions in which they may 
not be socially desirable. 
 
Some patents are infringed intentionally.  In other cases, the rival firm infringes the 
patent because it has not taken care (e.g., engaged in a search of patent records) to avoid 
the infringement.  It follows that the infringement problem can be treated like that of 
accidental injuries. 
 
Suppose the rival firm has a choice of taking care (search) or not taking care (no search).  
Let x be the cost of taking care to avoid infringement.  Let c be the probability that 
infringement occurs when the rival firm has taken care, and let nc be the probability that 
infringement occurs when the rival firm has not taken care.   
 
We will make a few simplifying assumptions for the analysis of waiver agreements.  
First, we will assume consistent beliefs regarding the patent’s validity (Pp = Pd = P).  
Second, in the analysis below we will assume that the patent holder loses his monopoly 
only through some conduct by the rival that could form the basis of an infringement 
claim – even if it is not technically infringement.  This rules out instances in which the 
rival firm takes some action that causes the incumbent to lose its monopoly, but the 
incumbent has no credible basis at all for an infringement claim.  Third, we will simplify 
matters by assuming that the patent holder does not introduce any ex post static 
efficiencies (e.g., demand inducement).   Fourth, we will assume that maintenance of the 
patent monopoly is socially desirable, which means that  – W – Ld > 0. 
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A patent holder could enter into a predispute waiver, in which the monopolist agrees not 
to sue the rival for infringement.  First, let’s consider a standard waiver.  In a standard 
waiver, the potential plaintiff (patent holder) accepts a payment in exchange for an 
agreement not to sue the rival firm when it infringes the patent.  The minimum price 
demanded by the patent holder for the waiver is 
 
(12)   nc(Gp + γ ) – [c(1–P)(Gp + γ ) +cCp]  . 
 
This is the difference between the patent holder’s expected loss in the absence of the right 
to sue for infringement and his expected loss given the right to sue for infringement.24  
The maximum offer from the rival (or potential defendant) would be 
 
(13)     x + cCd + cPLd , 
 
which reflects the expected costs of search, litigation, and infringement liability.25  It 
follows that a standard waiver will be exchanged when 
 
(14)    (nc –c(1–P))(Gp + γ ) – cPLd – x < c(Cp + Cd) . 
 
In other words, when the joint benefits of deterrence, as between the two parties, are less 
than the total cost of litigation, a standard waiver will be exchanged. 
 
Now let us consider an injunctive waiver.  In the injunctive waiver, the potential plaintiff 
(patent holder) accepts (or gives) a payment in exchange for an agreement not to sue the 
rival and for the rival to forgo the infringing activity. 
 
The injunctive waiver is acceptable to the potential plaintiff if  
 
(15)  S + nc(Gp + γ ) > nc(Gp + γ ) – [(c(1–P)(Gp + γ ) +cCp] 
 
The second term on the left hand side reflects the assumption that the monopolist will 
lose nothing in the event that an infringing act takes place, because the waiving defendant 
will immediately forgo the infringing conduct.  As a result, the injunctive waiver is far 
more valuable to the patent holder than is the standard waiver. 
 
The injunctive waiver is acceptable to the potential defendant if 
 
(16)  S + ncLd < x + cCd + cPLd . 
 
An injunctive waiver will be mutually agreeable when: 
                                                 
24 For the formal analysis of waiver incentives in the context of ordinary litigation, see Hylton (2000). 
25 To simplify we are ignoring the possible damage claim component, which would be purely speculative at 
the stage of a waiver negotiation.  Moreover, under the Hatch-Waxman Act, pioneer drug developers can 
file infringement suits after being notified that a generic intends to enter the market (see, e.g., Blair & 
Cotter (2002), at 505-506).  This model applies especially to litigation under the Hatch-Waxman 
provisions, which is the most common source of reverse patent settlements today.  
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(17)  (nc – cP)Ld – [c(1–P)(Gp + γ )] –  x < c(Cp + Cd) 
 
Finally, consider the social interest in waivers.  In a setting in which no one litigates, so 
patents are infringed at will, the social cost would be 
 
(18)         nc( – W – Ld) 
 
With infringement litigation available, the total social cost is 
 
(19)       x + c(1–P)( – W – Ld) + c(Cp + Cd) 
 
It follows that patent litigation is not socially desirable if 
 
(20)    [nc–c(1–P)]( – W – Ld) – x < c(Cp + Cd)  , 
 
which means that the social benefit from deterring infringement less the cost of avoiding 
infringement is less than the patent litigation costs.  Even if all patents are socially 
desirable, patent litigation may not be socially desirable.   
 
More importantly, comparing the social waiver incentive condition (20) to the private 
waiver incentive conditions [(17) and (14)], it is clear that the private and social 
incentives for waiving infringement litigation are not the same.  Because of the 
externalities present in the patent context, the private waiver incentive conditions diverge 
from the social waiver conditions.  This is not true in the normal (e.g., tort) litigation 
context, where the private waiver condition and the social waiver condition are the same 
(Hylton, 2000). 
 
In the standard litigation context, predispute waivers provide a Coasean solution to the 
problem of inefficient litigation.26  In the patent infringement setting, private waiver 
agreements do not provide a solution to the problem of inefficient infringement litigation. 
 
There is more to be said about the private and social incentive conditions for waivers.  
First, compare the standard private waiver condition (15) to the social waiver condition 
(20).  They imply the following: 
 
Proposition 5: If the probability of infringement is the same whether or not the rival takes 
care (nc=c), then the optimal penalty Gp + W – (1– γ) guarantees that standard 
waivers will be exchanged when and only when patent infringement litigation is socially 
undesirable. 
 
To see this note that if nc=c, then (14), the condition for privately optimal waivers, 
becomes 
                                                 
26 On the inefficiency of litigation, see Shavell (1982b).  On waivers as a Coasean solution, see Hylton 
(2000). 
 21
 
(21)    cP(Gp + γ – Ld) – x < c(Cp + Cd) 
 
and (20), the condition for socially optimal waivers, becomes 
 
(22)    cP( – W – Ld) – x < c(Cp + Cd)   
 
Thus, if nc=c, and if the monopolist pays a penalty equal to Gp + W – (1– γ), private 
waivers allowing infringement to occur will be exchanged when and only when patent 
litigation is socially undesirable.  If the probability of infringement is not independent of 
the care taken by the rival, then the optimal penalty is more complicated.27 
 
Now compare the injunctive waiver condition (17) to the social waiver condition (20).  If 
nc=c, then (17) becomes 
 
(23) c(1–P)(Ld – Gp – γ ) –  x < c(Cp + Cd) 
 
and it is socially desirable to enforce patents when  
 
(24) cP( – W – Ld) > x + c(Cp + Cd)   
 
If the monopolist is required to pay the penalty Gp + W – (1– γ), then the private 
incentive for the exchange of injunctive waivers (preventing infringement) becomes 
 
(25) c(1–P)( – W – Ld)  >  x + c(Cp + Cd) . 
  
Proposition 6: If the probability of infringement is the same whether or not the rival takes 
care (nc=c), and if the ex ante probability of infringement is greater than fifty percent 
(P  ½), then the optimal penalty Gp + W – (1– γ) guarantees that injunctive waivers 
will be exchanged only when patent infringement litigation is socially undesirable.28 
 
These results show that the internalization approach to the optimal penalty (8) is a 
possible solution to the incentive alignment problem in the waiver setting, but only under 
special conditions.  Specifically, the optimal penalty aligns private and social incentives 
to settle, and to waive, if the probability of infringement is the same whether or not the 
firm conducts a search. 
 
Although the incentive alignment approach is possible in the waiver context, it requires 
much more information than in the settlement context.  The informational requirements 
                                                 
27 The optimal penalty in the general standard waiver case is Gp + W – (1– γ) + [(nc–c)/(nc–c(1–P))]Ld.  
The last term is an additional charge to the monopolist because his contract has increased the rate of 
infringement and at the same time denied society the gain from that increased rate of infringement. 
28 The optimal penalty in the general injunctive waiver case is Gp + W – ( – γ) – [(1–2P)/(1–P))]Ld , 
where  =([(nc–c(1–P)]/c(1–P)). 
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are so steep, in the waiver context, that the optimal penalty approach may not be a 
practical solution. 
 
4. Risk Aversion, Clouds over Patents, and Other Costs 
 
There are other costs that could be incorporated into the model of this paper.  Some 
commentators have noted that risk aversion is a factor that drives some patent holders to 
seek injunctive settlements.29  In any event, the cost of risk could be incorporated into 
this analysis as another cost that, like litigation costs, the parties can avoid by entering 
into a settlement. 
 
Some commentators have pointed to the uncertainty surrounding the patent as a 
motivating factor behind injunctive settlements.  A patent, as commentators have noted, 
is not a right to exclude, but a right to try to exclude.  It is a probabilistic property right.30  
However, the holder of a patent clearly has an incentive to increase its value by reducing 
the likelihood that it will be found insufficient as a bar to some rival. 
 
Transaction cost reduction provides another motivation to seek an injunctive settlement.  
Patents are traded.  If the uncertainty concerning validity can be reduced, it will be easier 
to trade in patents.  Uncertainty is a transaction cost that obstructs efficient trades in the 
market for patents. 
 
III. Practical Implications 
 
As a preliminary matter, the reverse payment settlements that have become controversial 
in competition-blocking litigation, particularly in the patent antitrust and antidumping 
settings, reflect features that are observed generally in injunctive litigation.  The parties in 
injunctive litigation have the option of choosing a standard settlement that preserves the 
status quo or an injunctive settlement that implements the terms sought by the plaintiff.  
Both types of settlement are potentially wealth enhancing to the litigating parties, and to 
society as well, because they avoid expenditures on litigation.  Injunctive settlements are 
likely where the gain to the plaintiff from the injunction exceeds the loss to the defendant.  
Reverse payment settlements are likely to be observed whenever the stakes from the 
injunction are large relative to the damages and the costs of litigation. 
 
These general observations may take on a special importance in the context of 
competition-blocking litigation.  The gain to the plaintiff from the injunction, in the 
competition blocking context, will be correlated with the consumer welfare loss from 
blocking competition.  Injunctive lawsuits will tend to be filed in areas where the 
potential consumer harm is greatest.  Injunctive settlements will be among those lawsuits 
with the greatest potential harm to consumers, and (virtually) all of them will be reverse 
settlements (Proposition 1).  For these reasons, the suspicions concerning reverse 
settlements in the competition-blocking context are warranted. 
 
                                                 
29 See Crane (2002). 
30 Shapiro (2003) 
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Those suspicions, however, have to be balanced against the social welfare gains that are 
generated by reverse payment (injunctive) settlements.  They reduce litigation costs.  
Moreover, if the reason for blocking competition is to support dynamic (innovation) or 
static efficiency incentives (market development), then the settlements may improve 
welfare in some cases.  The mere fact that a large reverse settlement payment has 
occurred is not a sufficient basis for inferring that the settlement reduces social welfare.31  
These straightforward observations have been disregarded in some of the critical 
discussions of reverse settlements. 
 
The core source of controversy surrounding injunctive settlements is that the social 
incentive to settle differs from the private incentive.  This is also a feature observed 
generally in litigation.  In the general litigation context, commentators have noted that 
parties may settle when it would be better from society’s perspective if they litigated in 
order to enhance the stock of legal capital (Fiss 1984; Hylton 2000).  The mere existence 
of litigation costs does not imply a divergence between private and social settlement 
incentives.  Litigation costs (in most models) are borne entirely by the parties.  Given 
this, any settlement achieved to avoid litigation costs is also consistent with social 
welfare.  But once we consider broader societal effects from litigation – such as effects 
on the stock of legal capital or the congestion of courts – then we must recognize that the 
private and social settlement incentives diverge. 
 
The divergence between private and social incentives is especially noticeable in the 
competition-blocking scenario.  The reason is that there is a third party, the consumer, 
who is directly affected by the parties’ settlement agreement.  
 
A. Variations on Settlement 
 
The model in this paper assumes that the settlement agreement follows a legitimate 
competition-blocking lawsuit – such as an antidumping prosecution or a patent 
infringement claim.  However, this need not be the case, and this raises some important 
issues that are not directly addressed by this model.  One can expand the model to take 
these additional issues into account. 
 
There are several types of competition-blocking settlements, some of which seem to fall 
outside of the model examined here.  One type is a competition-blocking settlement that 
is reached in connection with a lawsuit that has no connection to competition.  For 
example, the plaintiff could sue the defendant for defamation, and condition settlement 
on the defendant’s agreement to stay out of his market.  Suppose, for example, that the 
lawsuit is nothing more than a ruse to allow the parties to enter into a competition-
                                                 
31 If the stakes are sufficiently large, reverse payments will occur even though the likelihood of a finding of 
infringement is high.  Moreover, if the dynamic efficiency cost is substantial, the reverse settlement may 
enhance social welfare.  These are basic implications of the model in Part IV of this paper.  It is in contrast 
to one of the most widely-accepted views in the patent-antitrust literature that a large reverse payment 
should be taken as a clear sign that the patent is invalid, see, e.g., Hovenkamp (2004, at 28) (“a firm willing 
to pay roughly $75 million per year to keep an alleged infringer out of the market when a successful 
preliminary injunction would have done the same thing for the cost of obtaining the injunction indicates 
that the prospects for a preliminary injunction were very poor.”) 
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blocking agreement under the cloak of settlement.  If the lawsuit itself is ginned up for 
the sole purpose of cloaking an anticompetitive agreement, then both the social welfare 
loss from prohibiting competitive entry (W +Ld) and the litigation costs are elements of 
waste.  Unless there is some efficiency that is generated by the settlement, it should be 
considered per se illegal. 
 
A second variation based on the settlement just mentioned is one attached to a legitimate 
lawsuit.  Suppose the plaintiff brings a legitimate defamation lawsuit against the 
defendant and conditions settlement on the defendant agreeing to stay out of his market.  
The settlement saves society the litigation costs in this case.  Still, the lawsuit itself could 
not have led to the same result.  If there is no efficiency generated by the settlement, its 
social desirability will be determined by a comparison of the welfare loss and the avoided 
litigation costs. 
 
A third variation involves a real competition-blocking lawsuit, such as antidumping or 
patent infringement, that generates a settlement, as in this model; but the settlement is 
more restrictive of competition than the lawsuit itself.  For example, the settlement may 
require the defendant to stay out of several markets.  This variation is in fundamental 
respects the same as the second variation.  Assuming no efficiency gain generated by the 
settlement, its social desirability will be determined by a comparison of the total welfare 
loss (including the loss due to the additional restrictions) and the avoided litigation costs. 
 
There is a strong case for treating the second and third variations as per se antitrust 
violations.  The settlement could be efficient in both cases.  But the anticompetitive 
potential is clearly greater than in the case examined in the model of this paper.  And 
since the anticompetitive potential is virtually limitless in the second and third variations, 
a per se rule may be appropriate. 
 
These variations suggest the need for legal doctrines that distinguish settlements in (a) 
legitimate competition blocking lawsuits that are (b) within the boundaries of the 
lawsuit’s anticompetitive effect.  Settlements that do not satisfy these two conditions 
raise serious suspicions under the antitrust laws. 
 
B. Proposals for Regulating Settlements 
 
There are several types of proposals that have been suggested for regulating reverse 
payment injunctive settlements.  Perhaps the simplest is to declare all such settlements 
per se unlawful under the antitrust laws.  Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley (2003) proposed 
that reverse settlements that exceed the cost of litigation should be deemed per se illegal.  
The FTC, in the Schering-Plough litigation,32 adopted this position, though it was 
rejected by the appellate court. 
 
                                                 
32 In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, at 12 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2003), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9297/031218commissionopinion.pdf, vacated, 402 F3d 1056 (11th Cir. 
2005). 
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The analysis in this paper provides little support for such a per se prohibition.  First, the 
reverse settlement is a signal that the gain to the defendant from competitive entry 
(equivalently, the defendant’s loss from the injunction) is large relative to the damages 
and costs of litigation.  That is consistent with the claim that the settlement poses a risk to 
consumers.  However, the reason the plaintiff is willing to pay for the reverse settlement 
is that the plaintiff’s gain from the injunction is also large relative to the damages and 
litigation costs.  The plaintiff’s gain could be large because of the static (market 
development) or dynamic (innovation) gains from the injunction.  The mere fact that a 
large reverse payment is observed does not imply that the settlement reduces either 
overall social welfare of consumer welfare. 
 
Suppose the reverse settlement is less than the total cost of litigation, which would be 
permitted under the Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley proposal.  It should be clear that the 
plaintiff and defendant can alter the terms of settlement to bring about this result, 
whatever the social welfare effects of their settlement.  For example, the parties could 
agree to share all or parts of their markets rather than let the settlement payment be the 
only variable term of the agreement. 
 
Another per se rule was proposed in Crane (2002), which is to prohibit, on a per se basis, 
reverse payment injunctive settlements when the ex ante likelihood of a finding of 
infringement (P) is low and to adopt a per se legality rule when the likelihood of a 
finding of infringement is high.  This would require a preliminary determination of the 
likelihood of patent infringement as part of the antitrust trial.33 
 
This paper’s model indicates that there are other factors in addition to the ex ante 
likelihood of a finding of infringement that should be part of the analysis.  Certainly if the 
ex ante likelihood of a finding of infringement is close to one the settlement should be 
permitted.  This rule would be advisable even when there were no possible efficiency 
bases for enjoining competitive entry.  If the ex ante likelihood of a finding of 
infringement is almost one, prohibiting the injunctive settlement would be socially 
harmful because it would force wasteful litigation expenses. 
 
However, even if the ex ante likelihood of plaintiff success in the infringement suit is not 
high, a reverse settlement may be defensible on welfare grounds.  The reason is that in 
addition to the static welfare losses created by the settlement, a social planner would have 
to take into account the potential efficiency gains from the injunction.  For example, 
suppose the likelihood of a finding of infringement is only 50%.  Suppose the static 
welfare loss (from monopoly pricing) is $100, the gain from competitive entry is $100, 
and the total cost of litigation is only $20.  If there are no potential efficiency gains, the 
social gain from continued litigation would be $100, and the cost of that litigation would 
be only $20.  It would make sense, then, to ban the reverse injunctive settlement.  
However, suppose the efficiency gain from market development is $180.  In that case, the 
expected social gain from continued litigation would be $10, which is less than the total 
                                                 
33 For arguments against such an approach, see Brodley & O’Rourke (2002). One obvious problem with 
Crane’s proposal is that a “preliminary determination” of the patent infringement question could be such a 
costly and time consuming proceeding that it fails every test of its efficiency. 
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cost of litigation.  Even if the ex ante likelihood of an infringement finding were only 
40%, it would still be desirable to permit the reverse injunctive settlement.  This example 
shows that the potential efficiency gains do not have to overwhelm the potential static 
welfare losses for the reverse injunctive settlement to be socially desirable – and that is 
because of the existence of litigation costs. The greater the litigation costs, the less 
demanding society should be on the size of the potential efficiency gains and the ex ante 
likelihood of success in an infringement action.34 
 
Shapiro (2003) proposes a standard that would require settlements to give consumers the 
same level of welfare in expectation that they would receive had litigation occurred.  
Although it is not clear how such a standard would be implemented, it probably would 
require a comparison of the expected static welfare losses with expected efficiency gains.  
Presumably the settlement would be permitted under this standard only when expected 
efficiency gains exceeded expected welfare losses.  This approach ignores the risk of 
judicial error and litigation costs as factors that might justify a settlement on social 
welfare grounds.  The basis for ignoring these factors is unclear.  The risk of error and 
litigation expenses are real costs. 
 
A rule-of-reason approach35 to the review of a reverse settlement should take into account 
the ex ante likelihood of a finding of infringement, the likely welfare losses (a function of 
the scope of the patent), efficiency costs, and litigation costs.  Such a standard would be 
difficult to implement, and might lead to a recommendation to forbear from prohibiting 
reverse patent settlements unless there is clear evidence that market development and 
innovation incentives are not implicated by the dispute, which is likely to be rare.  Judge 
Posner, in Asahi Glass v. Pentech Pharmaceuticals,36 suggests that injunctive settlements 
should be upheld unless there are “suspicious circumstances” indicating anticompetitive 
effect.37  Suspicious circumstances might indicate that the patent settlement agreement is 
merely a device to facilitate collusion.38  This approach could provide the basis for a rule 
of reason test of settlements.  It would stay the hands of courts in cases where suspicious 
factors were not present.  The danger is that courts may expand the set of suspicious 
circumstances to include factors that are not reliable signals of anticompetitive effect. 
 
The strongest case for a per se prohibition of reverse settlements is offered by the 
antidumping setting.  In the antidumping setting we observe a domestic cartel seeking to 
exclude a low-price foreign rival.  The end result of a successful prosecution will be a 
reduction in consumer welfare.  The plaintiff cartel is not involved in innovation or the 
                                                 
34 One factor that weighs in favor of Crane’s approach is the fact that the social cost of rejecting an 
infringement claim is likely to be positive correlated with the ex ante probability of infringement.  In light 
of this Crane’s approach may be preferable because it comes close to the right answer in most cases 
without requiring an enormously difficult rule-of-reason analysis. 
35 See Blair & Cotter (2002), suggesting a rule of reason approach to reverse patent settlements; see also 
Schildkraut (2004). 
36 289 F.Supp. 986 (N.D. Ill 2003). 
37 Id. at 992.  Posner’s opinion indicate that courts also try to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate 
settlements, as suggested in the discussion in part III.A of this paper. 
38 Id.; see also Priest (1977).  Brodley & O’Rourke (2002) prefer to use suspicious circumstances in a per se 
framework that would enable courts to infer anticompetitive intent. 
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creation of static efficiencies that might justify a protected market.  In this scenario there 
is a strong case for prohibiting reverse settlements, or treating them as per se antitrust 
violations.  Under the conditions in which a reverse settlement is attractive, the settlement 
will very likely reduce social welfare, because the litigation costs avoided will be much 
smaller than the expected welfare losses.  However, even this “strongest case” does not 
extend to all injunctive settlements in the antidumping context.  There may be cases in 
which the litigation costs are large relative to the expected welfare losses, and as a result 
the injunctive settlement could be socially beneficial. 
 
Outside of the antidumping setting, the case for a per se prohibition of reverse settlements 
– even a conditional one based on the merits of the infringement claim or the size of 
litigation costs – becomes considerably weaker.  In the patent antitrust setting, the per se 
approach requires society to forgo static and dynamic efficiencies that might be supported 
by the injunction. 
 
Another approach to regulating settlements would remove antitrust immunity under the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine for settlement agreements that are clearly anticompetitive 
(Cho, 2009).  The traditional argument against applying antitrust law to prohibit 
anticompetitive settlement agreements is that they are merely the byproduct of litigation, 
and legitimate (not objectively baseless) litigation is immune from antitrust prosecution.39  
An alternative approach for regulating settlements would involve the courts either 
narrowing the antitrust immunity granted to litigation, or treating anticompetitive 
settlements under a different set of rules.  Although the proper way to distinguish 
undesirable settlements from the rest would be to weigh all of the factors mentioned 
earlier (ex ante likelihood of a finding of infringement, potential static welfare losses, 
potential efficiency gains, and litigation costs), an approximately correct result might be 
reached through an intent test based on objective evidence.  Under such a test, if the 
plaintiff pressured the defendant to reach a settlement under conditions in which he knew 
or had reason to know that the likelihood of infringement (P) is extremely low, the court 
would consider the settlement a sham. 
 
One difficulty with all of the new proposals for using antitrust law to regulate settlements 
is that the regulatory effect can be evaded if the potential litigants enter into waiver 
agreements.  Indeed, a per se ban on reverse payment settlements would simply cause 
firms to rush into waiver agreements. 
 
This paper proposes a third approach to regulating injunctive settlements.  That is to 
impose an optimal penalty (or subsidy) on to the plaintiff seeking to block competition.  
If the optimal penalty were imposed in the antidumping context, no firms would seek to 
block competition.  In the patent context, an optimal penalty could be negative (i.e., a 
subsidy) so that firms may still attempt to block competition even when paying the 
penalty.  The penalty, which generalizes the approach suggested in Landes (1983), would 
internalize the welfare losses (transfer plus deadweight loss) as well as the uncaptured 
efficiency gains. 
 
                                                 
39 Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993). 
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The optimal penalty approach would be administratively difficult, but perhaps no more so 
than a rule of reason standard applied with accuracy.  Indeed it might reduce 
administrative costs by switching the penalty assessment to some administrative process 
rather than using the courts to generate complicated legal doctrines to assess the legality 
of injunctive settlements. 
 
The optimal penalty approach has the additional feature that it will not necessarily lose its 
regulatory impact if firms opt for waiver agreements.  If the likelihood that infringement 
takes place is not greatly dependent on the patent search efforts of rival firms, the optimal 
penalty approach need not be changed in order to correct incentives even in the 
predispute waiver setting.  On the other hand, if the likelihood of infringement does 
depend on the patent search efforts of rivals, then agencies could apply a different set of 
penalties to predispute injunctive waiver agreements. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This paper presents an economic analysis of injunctive and reverse settlements, and 
applies it to competition-blocking litigation in the patent-antitrust and antidumping 
settings.  Because of the consumer welfare implications of settlements, some 
commentators have suggested competition-blocking settlements should be banned.  The 
general issue is the divergence between private and social incentives to settle.  This paper 
identifies the factors that account for that divergence and offers a framework for 
evaluating the welfare implications of competition-blocking settlements.   
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